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CIA's Carlucci: The agency's morale is 'high'



This is the last part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978.

By MICHAEL SHAW

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Q. Has the Central Intelligence Agency provided the president with a worse-case scenario in the event that there are further disruptions of the oil supply from the Mid East?

A. We supply the president with a continuing analysis including both optimistic and worse-case assumptions.

Q. How pessimistic is your worse-case assumption?

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Q. One book written about the beginning of World War II suggested that Japan's timing of its attack on Pearl Harbor was related to an approximately 90-day-or-so supply of oil. Does history repeat itself?

A. I don't know about history repeating itself, but we can certainly learn lessons from history and one of the great lessons of Pearl Harbor was that our nation needs effective intelligence. It was precisely as a result of Pearl Harbor that the predecessor agency of the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services — the OSS — was created.

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Q. There has been considerable discussion that the morale of personnel in the Central Intelligence Agency has fallen off in recent years.

Would you attribute that development to the environment and attitudes within the United States toward the intelligence business generally, or would you say that there have been some organizational problems within the agency that are being met at the current time?

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A. Morale is a nebulous thing. Obviously there are a number of factors that impact on morale. The barrage of criticism to which the agency has been subjected has had its impact on our employees. This is particularly true because of the facts have been distorted or inaccurate and, given the nature of our business, we are unable to put them in perspective. Like any organization, we have our internal problems. We like to think that we are dealing with them effectively.

From my own experience, in a number of government agencies, I would characterize the morale of the CIA as high. Certainly we have some of the most competent and dedicated people in government working in the CIA. Many of them work extremely long hours and cannot even tell their families what they are doing. Perhaps a measure of the state of our health is the fact that we have no trouble recruiting people. In fact, the number of applications for employment with the agency has been going up and the quality of people that are coming into the agency today is as good as, if not better than, it ever has been.

Q. Which is more important, the quality of the people that you bring into the Central Intelligence Agency, or the development of the new technologies that are making the spy business very different than it used to be?

A. Both are important. Without quality people, you do not develop quality technology. If the question is what is more important, technical collection or human collection, the answer once again is that both are important. The technical systems can accomplish a great deal but they have their limitations. They can only tell you what is happening right now or what happened yesterday. It really takes human intelligence to know what people's intentions are.

Q. You are privy to probably the most stark view of the world of just about anybody. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future

of the United States?

A. Basically, I am an optimist. I think our country has the resources, both human and natural, and the will to deal with the problems it faces.

Q. Do you place your guarded optimism within a certain time frame in which we must do certain things?

A. Certainly. And some of those things have already been discussed in this interview. We need to deal with the question of our defense capability, vis-a-vis the growing defense capability of the Soviets. We need to deal with problems such as nuclear proliferation and we need to deal with the problems of energy and the Third World.

Q. Is time running out on any of these issues?

A. In foreign affairs, time does not usually run out. The problems become more difficult to deal with if you do not face up to them. In most of the areas I have mentioned, I believe our country is moving to face up to the problems,

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I think that you need to establish a surrogate process through congressional oversight and something like the present Intelligence Oversight Board, which would see that intelligence activities are within the acceptable limits of U.S. public opinion. These oversight mechanisms exist in one form or another today and are still evolving. All and all, I think we are moving in a healthy direction and, aside from correcting some of the problems I mentioned earlier, I do not think I would try to reverse course in any way at this point.

Q. What would you do to sharpen the intelligence community's ability to discern and prioritize signals from different parts of the world?

A. We have given a lot of thought to this problem and have taken certain steps to deal with it. The most important was to establish a focal point in the intelligence community for "warning." We have put one of our most senior and able officers in charge of that function. He in turn reports to an intelligence committee which I chair. This has worked very well and I think will continue to serve us in excellent fashion.

Q. Covert operations, particularly during the Vietnam/Watergate period, took on some negative connotations that may not necessarily fit in their historical perspective. Can you give our readership a view of covert operations within its long-term historical perspective that can enlighten us on what a nation must do or be able to do in the world in order to meet the challenges that we face today?

A. First of all, both the president and the Congress have recognized that covert action is a legitimate foreign policy tool. That is exactly what it should be, a foreign policy tool, and not an independent capability. Covert action is attempting to influence events in other parts of the world without the source of that influence becoming known. Most people do not have any problem with trying to influence events in other parts of the world. Indeed, that is what much of our foreign policy is about. Most people also recognize that most things that an intelligence organization does have to be done clandestinely.

Somehow, it is just when you put the two together that people have problems with it. Yet one can conceive of many circumstances where a friendly, democratic government needs help. It cannot accept that help overtly without incurring political difficulties. Let us say, for example, that they have to deal with a terrorist problem and ask the United States for that help. If the statemen are politically vulnerable, they may well ask that that help be given clandestinely.

I find that when most people take issue with covert action they are really quarreling with the policy and not the instrument. Just because I disagree with giving economic aid to country X, that does not mean that I believe economic aid should not continue to be a foreign policy tool. Covert action has become associated with one or two highly controversial foreign policies.

Once again, the successes cannot be mentioned because the credit for those successes must go to the foreign government, not to us. The important point is to ensure that a mechanism for policy control is set up and that we not do away with the policy instrument itself. Such a control mechanism has now been established, although, as I mentioned earlier, it would be appropriate to cut down on the number of congressional committees which have to be informed when a covert action operation is undertaken.

Q. Following the definition of a successful covert action as being in fact covert, I would assume that one reason we do not read too much in the press about the activity of KGB or covert operations of terrorist groups or of perhaps Cuba and other countries, is that by that definition, if they are not discovered, they have been successful. Can you outline, for example, in the Mideast, what are the operative forces beneath the surface there? To what extent is there the unreported and unseen challenge of the opposition, if one wants to put it that way?

A. Well, I cannot go into any detail without revealing sources of information. Incidentally, most people do not appreciate how easy it is for another country's counterintelligence operation to trace a seemingly harmless factual statement about a situation back to a particular agent or a particular method. So, we can't be too careful.

One thing that is important to recognize is

that, in most cases where our adversaries have been successful, they have been willing to undertake either covert actions or overt military actions. We now see a substantial Cuban military presence in Africa, for example. There are various parts of the world where you see a substantial Soviet presence. They do not really operate under the same set of constraints that we, as a society, do. In most cases you find them exploiting existing unrest.

That is why it is so important for our country to work to resolve problems which create unrest and conflicts between and within nations. It is also why it is important for our country to help countries friendly to us to resolve their underlying economic and social problems. Certainly the KGB is at work and they put substantial resources into their operations. But, our country, despite the constraints our intelligence organizations face, has superior intelligence service.

Q. At the risk of doing some crystal-ball gazing, do you believe that the world energy crisis can be dealt with in the next few years?

A. I think it can be dealt with but not without the exercise of a great deal of willpower by Americans and by the people of other countries in the free world. The problem is essentially one of restraining increasing consumption while stimulating sources of production. Unfortunately the rate of consumption has so far outstripped the rate of increase of sources of production that over the next few years only consumption restraint will solve the problem. But, given the will, I think we can solve it.

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International Scene

CIA's Frank Carlucci: 'Don't talk of your successes'



This is the first part of a three-part interview with Frank Carlucci, who became deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in early 1978. After serving in the Navy and graduating from Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, he served with the Foreign Service in South Africa; Kinshasa, Congo; Zanzibar and Brazil. He also has been director of the Office of Economic Opportunity; deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget; under-secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; and ambassador to Portugal.

By MICHAEL SHAW

Q. Mr. Carlucci, what are the challenges the United States will encounter in world affairs in the 1980s?

A. That's a rather broad question. Let me divide my answer into a number of categories. First there would be the national security challenges: our defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviets and a whole series of treaties that are under negotiation, like disarmament and mutual and balanced force reductions. What posture will the United States and the Soviet Union take in these negotiations? Certainly we will continue to face the problem of nuclear proliferation. The energy problem will remain with us and, indeed, it could become even more critical in the '80s. If consumption continues to go up as it has and production remains constant as predicted, additional measures will have to be taken on the energy front.

There is also the question of relationships with the Third World; the issue of equitable distribution of wealth between the have and have-not nations. Connected with this are the difficult issues posed by Soviet and Cuban expansion activity, particularly in Africa. There will also be questions of how the United States can strengthen her relationships with her

allies; how our relationship with the People's Republic of China will evolve; and what role the continuing problem of Vietnam and Cambodia may play in that relationship.

Q. What is the Central Intelligence Agency's role, as you view it, in meeting these challenges?

A. Fundamentally, our role is to provide the policymaker with the best possible information on which he can base policy decisions. This means efficient and good collection, high-quality analysis, and links with the policymaker that permit us to respond to his high-priority needs.

Q. What effect, if any, have recent revelations and books about the agency had on its ability to perform these functions, particularly with respect to its relations with foreign intelligence agencies and sources of information?

A. Obviously, no intelligence organization can function at peak efficiency in the constant glare of the public spotlight. But, we accept some of this as a fact of life. Books always cause a problem. Particularly damaging are the ones that reveal our sources and methods. Consequently, we have established a procedure

to try to deal with this problem. Employees sign a contract when they come to work for us authorizing us to review their manuscripts for sensitive intelligence information. We have had generally good results with this practice, with one or two notable exceptions. In the case of Frank Snepp, we took the issue to court and so far the position of the agency has been upheld. There is also a group in Washington, D.C., that publishes a bulletin entitled "Covert Action," whose purpose is to expose the names of CIA personnel and agents overseas. This is particularly harmful, and so we are consulting with the Congress and the attorney general on measures that might be taken to curtail it. It is very difficult in an intelligence organization to ever know how much information you might have received if these kinds of activities were not going on. People who co-operate with us express concern about these books, and the activities of people like Philip Agee. We have reason to believe that this has impacted adversely on the flow of information to us. Nonetheless, we continue to be an effective organization.

Q. Recently, there have been articles in the press which have criticized the agency with respect to developments in Iran and other articles which suggest that the limitations that have been placed on the agency and criticism of the agency have hobbled its effectiveness. Would you care to comment on these statements?

A. It is hard to generalize on these matters. Generally, when people talk about intelligence failures, they tend to think in absolute terms. But, intelligence does not operate in absolute terms. It is always possible to have more information about a given situation. How much information is enough? In cases such as Iran, the press accounts prior to the departure of the shah were generally exaggerated. This is not to say that our predictions were perfect. But it is certainly inaccurate to say that the intelligence community did not forecast the difficulties in Iran. We have tried recently to sharpen our reporting and analysis on broad social movements.

One of the problems in the intelligence business is that you can never talk about your successes. Generally, a successful operation is only successful as long as it can be kept secret. To talk about our successes, we com-

promise our sources and our methods. Usually, it is only the so-called failures that come to light. That's just one of the facts of life that we have to live with in the intelligence business. I assure you there have been successes and that they have been important successes.

As far as constraints are concerned, this is essentially a matter of establishing the proper checks and balances without impeding intelligence effectiveness. We think that Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter at the outset of his administration, is an important step in this direction. We also think it is possible to develop charter legislation which will set out broad guidelines for intelligence activities which will reassure the Congress and the American people that intelligence organizations are under control, yet will not impede their effectiveness.

In connection with the charter legislation, there are some areas of concern to us. For example, we are required to report plans to carry out covert actions to seven committees of Congress. That obviously imposes constraints on the president's ability to carry on covert action activities. Mind you, we think we ought to report to Congress, but to a reasonable number of committees, not seven. The Freedom of Information Act has caused us a number of problems. We find that the practice of using the disclosure process in trials to push for the revelation of more classified material than the Intelligence Community can reasonably accept, and thereby stymie the prosecution—a practice referred to as "gray mail"—has impeded our efforts to deal with serious security breaches. We also think that the antiquated 1917 Espionage Act is not a good instrument for solving the kinds of problems such as the "Covert Action" bulletin problem, that I described earlier.

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Next: Covert operations.

(As Received)

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
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An Interview with Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

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C.I.A. Aide Says News Leaks in U.S. Worry Allies

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 17 — The problem of leaks of sensitive information to the press is inherent in the American political system, but Frank C. Carlucci, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, says he believes leaks now are the worst he has seen in 23 years of Government service.

In an interview last week, he said a spate of leaks during the last year by former C.I.A. officers, current Pentagon officials and current members of the National Security Council and Congress had prompted "friendly foreign intelligence

services" to be more cautious in sharing secrets with the United States.

Recent leaks disclosed classified information about American relations with South Korea and Japan, new weapons systems and the identities of covert operatives of the C.I.A., he said, adding that some of the revelations had come about inadvertently through accidental releases under the Freedom of Information Act.

But Mr. Carlucci, a career Foreign Service officer who was appointed to his C.I.A. post in 1977, said he was much more concerned about the "erosion of the environment" for protecting national-security information. He said the erosion was caused by "leaks for policy reasons" by officials wishing to influence a course of action.

He said he was firmly opposed to "running one investigation after another" to try to find the source of the disclosures, which has usually been futile. Instead, he said, the solution was to reinstitute "a sense of values on the part of employees about what is proper and what isn't, emphasizing that while whistle-blowers have their place, legitimate grievance mechanisms and mechanisms for dissent exist."

Mr. Carlucci said the combination of deliberate leaks and accidental disclosures had prompted virtually every intelligence service that maintains relations with the C.I.A. to voice concern during the last eight months "about our ability to protect the information they give us."

"It isn't all one-sided," he said of the foreign complaints, explaining that Britain, West Germany and Australia were developing freedom-of-information laws and were "trying to profit by our experience."

But he went on to say that the gravity of the disclosure problem, underlined by C.I.A. compliance with about 4,000 requests a year under the information law, could be illustrated by a foreign intelligence chief "who told me he couldn't cooperate as much as he'd like, because of the disclosure practice."

Covert Operative Identified

A visiting British intelligence delegation recently told American authorities they needed new assurances that their se-

crets would not be compromised by the information law.

There was also a disturbing incident, Administration officials said, in which a covert operative of an American intelligence service was identified through Freedom of Information disclosures. "He got a knock on the door and his cover was blown," an official said.

Mr. Carlucci noted that some foreign intelligence services were so jumpy about the American disclosure practices that they had sharply curbed secret-sharing, even on matters where the C.I.A. knew they had certain valuable information.

"They don't say, 'We aren't going to give you X, Y, Z,'" he said. "That is not the way intelligence services work. But we do know of information in the possession of friendly services that was not given to us."

Mr. Carlucci said he and his aides, as well as officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, were working closely with Senate and House committees to draft new legislation increasing the Government's power to protect vital secrets. He said a draft bill might be ready by late next month.

"I am mildly optimistic that we can do something about the Freedom of Information Act problem and reasonably sure we can protect secrets," he said.

He said that he approved of the principles embodied in the 1974 law making it possible to obtain Government documents not protected by the security exemptions. But he said the C.I.A. had to commit 80 to 90 employees to the processing of such requests and received no extra funds for the purpose.

CIA deputy director offers insight on U.S. prestige

Frank Carlucci, a Scranton native named deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1978, is interviewed by staff writer Don Sarvey.

Q: When you work for an organization such as the CIA it must make your outlook on the world a little different than the ordinary citizen. How does it differ?

A: Well, it's an enormous education. You get a perspective of the world that you can't get anywhere else in government. I've been a for-

eign service officer for some 22 years, serving in different parts of the world, but never have I gotten quite the overview that I have now. Not only do you see what the policies are, but you get an insight into all the inside information. From that aspect, it's a fascinating experience.

Q: It sometimes seems through American eyes that the world is an ever more hostile place. Is that really true? Do we have genuine friends?

A: Let's put it this way, I think the world's a more complicated place. Twenty years ago when I came into the foreign service, things were fairly straightforward. I can recall at that time we were worried about Korea. Korea was allied with China. China was allied with the Soviet Union. We've now seen a proxy struggle between the Soviet Union and China, and who knows where Korea stands? We've seen the Third World emerge as ... an ideological

battleground. We've seen the non-aligned movement. We've seen the growth of strategic weapons and an effort to reach a SALT agreement. We've seen national revolutions ... most recently in Iran. It's become a lot more complicated. I don't think this ... means that we don't have friends, that people don't listen to us and respect us. The fact that our president is in Israel trying to bring the two sides of that dispute together is evidence of the continuing prestige of the United States.

Q: With detente seemingly losing ground, is there any chance there's a new Cold War era ahead of us?

A: I don't know that I'd accept your characterization that we're losing ground. If you put yourself in the shoes of the Soviets, if you are Ivan Ivanovich looking at your government, we find that that government has problems. It's got a succession problem, it's got a leadership problem — aging leadership. It's got an oil problem. Their oil is topping out, rising demand. It's got an agricultural problem. It's got a problem of rising consumer expectations and declining growth rates. And they haven't done all that well. Obviously, they've got problems with China. And their relations with Japan are not all that good. They don't have much to show after massive support for Castro all these years in Latin America. In Africa they've got some targets of opportunity, but they were kicked out of Ghana and Guinea, Zaire, Sudan, Egypt, Somalia.

They've made some progress, obviously, in places like Afghanistan and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, (but) it's by no means certain that they've done all that well in the Middle East — not even in Iran, because the foreign policy orientation of Iran has yet to be decided.

So, I don't accept the characterization that we are losing. I would accept the characterization that the Soviet Union has become much more adventurist in its foreign policy. It has shown a greater propensity or greater willingness to use its own military personnel overseas and to exercise its influence through Cuban and other proxies. And that is a significant new development that we have to take into account.

Q: Did China give any advance warning to the U.S. of its intent to invade Vietnam?

A: Well, the vice prime minister of China really didn't hide his intentions from anybody at any time, whether he was in the United States or in China. He made it clear that the People's Republic of China took a hostile view toward the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia and indicated China would be obliged to take action. It came as no great surprise to me.

Q: There has been some criticism that the U.S. government didn't have adequate intelligence, or perhaps adequate analysis of the information we did have, to anticipate events in Iran. Is that true?

CONTINUED

A: Well, that's a complicated question. The answer is, yes, we were able to follow the decline in the shah's authority and were able to predict, at least over the short term, that the populace was turning against him and that Iran was in for serious problems. It is fair to say that neither we nor anybody else that I know of predicted the dimensions of the national revolution that occurred — that one man would return on a crest of popular emotion the way that Khomeini returned, or that the country ... would start to splinter and we would see leftist factions and rightist factions and religious factions and modernization factions and now ... women's groups. That sort of thing, we didn't predict that.

Q: Had there been changes in the shah's regime, liberalizations, say a year ago, is it possible he could have survived?

A: Well, don't forget that one of the reasons the shah got in trouble was his liberalization program. He was the one who tried to modernize Iran. He was the one who gave the rights to women. And it's Khomeini who has taken the position that those rights are not appropriate under Islamic law. So, I don't know that more progressive policies would have helped him. You always, in a situation like this, have the question of when do you pass the point of no return? At what point could he have altered his policies, tried to put together a coalition, tried to work with the religious opposition? I couldn't even hazard a guess on when that might have been appropriate. Certainly, in retrospect, one can say had some action been taken a year ago it might have been helpful. But the dimensions of the upheaval in Iran suggest that it was very deep-rooted.

Q: What are the prospects for stability in that country in the coming months?

A: We're all hopeful, of course, but there's no question (that) there are factions. There are leftist factions ... and then there are more conservative groups. Prime Minister Bazargan is trying to get his government under way. The military ... is without a command structure. The populace is divided and the economy is in bad shape. There are various nationalist groups, the Kurds for example, that are demanding more autonomy. The country is, in effect, riddled with problems. My own view is that, despite the best efforts of well-intentioned leaders, it will take some time to sort out these problems.

Q: Does what happened in Iran hold any lesson for other Middle East countries, such as Saudi Arabia? Is there a danger of revolution spreading — something with Islamic overtones?

A: I think Iran does demonstrate that Moslem fundamentalism can be a potent political force. You have powerful Moslem groups in places like Egypt. You may have noticed that President Sadat made a speech about two weeks ago in which he criticized the Moslem Brotherhood for opposing his policies. The Moslem Brotherhood is a fundamentalist group. Saudi Arabia is a little bit different, in the sense that it is much less secularized than some of the other countries are. And, of course, the shah had almost completely secularized his country.

Also, you've got to take into account the fact that the rest of the Arab world is, by and large, (composed of) Sunnite Moslems, as opposed to the Shiites in Iran. That's significant, both in religious terms and in political terms, in the sense that the Shiites tend to have a more hierarchical religious structure, which can give rise to a single, paramount leader, whereas the Sunnites do not. The Sunnites are much more inclined to work with a secular government, whereas the Shiites traditionally have been a sect of opposition. It is by no means automatic that this would spread to other countries. But certainly, the fact that Moslem fundamentalism can be a potent political force will not be

Q: How keenly felt is the loss of the CIA stations in Iran that, I understand, monitored Soviet missile sites?

A: Well, I'm not able to talk about that. We don't talk about any of our intelligence operations.

Q: It has been suggested that perhaps the loss of these would affect our ability to monitor a new SALT agreement.

A: Well, I think it's premature for me to comment on that. The SALT agreement hasn't been signed, so we really don't know all of its provisions. And there will be quite an extensive debate in the Senate on ratification. There, one of the central issues will be verification. Until the administration knows the provisions of the agreement and has prepared its presentation, I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment.

Q: With oil playing an increasing role in world politics, how closely does the CIA monitor the flow of oil and keep tabs on reserves in various parts of the world?

A: Very closely. It's one of our principal concerns. We make regular reports on it to the president, to the Department of Energy, to the secretary of state and secretary of defense. We've also put out one unclassified report on the world's oil reserves and we've had some updates. We monitor that very closely.

Q: We hear a lot about spy satellites and sophisticated gadgets of all sorts. Have these things replaced the man in the trenchcoat?

A: By no means. In fact, they're complementary. Technical collection can generally only tell you what happened yesterday or, if you're lucky, what's happening today. It can't tell you anybody's intentions. And the traditional human collection is extremely valuable in knowing people's intentions. Our effort is trying to get the two to work together. One will never supplant the other.

Q: How much information is out there for the taking, without any special effort?

A: An awful lot of our information comes from unclassified sources. We only gather information clandestinely when we can't get it overtly. I can't remember the figures, but I think some 30 or 40 percent of the information used by our analysts does come from unclassified sources.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

Interviewed by Lynne Joiner on KPIX-TV

November 15, 1978

LYNNE JOINER: Mr. Carlucci, what is the proper role of the CIA in a free and democratic society? I mean, how can the public really trust "honorable men," as former Director Colby called himself, after the revelations of Watergate, the secret Angolan war, the Pike and Church Committee revelations?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FRANK CARLUCCI: Well, Lynne, you've really asked the \$64 question. Certainly any free society, such as our society, needs to have good information so that our policy-makers can make the proper decisions to maintain our security. Unfortunately, we don't live in a perfect world. And it's necessary to try and obtain information that in many cases the countries don't want us to have; to just cite examples, certain countries that are engaged in the development of nuclear weapons. Obviously they don't want that to be found out, but it's in our vital interests to know it. And there are terrorist groups that we have to penetrate.

The Soviet Union, as everyone knows, has devoted very substantial resources to armament. And it's important for us to have adequate warning should anything untoward happen.

So the role of an intelligence organization is to gather information from all sources, open sources, clandestine sources -- and by the way, most of our information comes from open sources -- and to analyze it and to present it to the policy-makers in the form that they can best use it to make their decisions.

Our philosophy is that we ought to make as much of our finished information public as possible. Last year we put out some 150 publications, including some quite meaningful ones on subjects such as economic developments in the Soviet Union and China; publications on energy. But obviously we have to maintain certain secrets in order to protect our sources. Somebody in a denied area is not going to give us information

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if he suspects that he's going to see his name in a congressional hearing or in a newspaper article somewhere.

As far as maintaining controls, we think that a lot of progress has been made in that area in the past several years. The President has set up an Intelligence Oversight Board, where anybody can bring a complaint. The board reports directly to him. We have oversight committees in Congress, with which we are working very closely. And I think we can be assured that adequate safeguards and procedures have been established to prevent the kind of abuses that have come out in the past.

JOINER: Back in 1954, though, the Hoover Commission investigated intelligence in this country. And they said at that time "There are no rules in such a game, that if the U. S. is to survive, longstanding American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered. We must destroy enemies by more clever, sophisticated and effective methods than those used against us."

And I think that the concern of a lot of Americans is over the secret part of activities by Central Intelligence. John Stockwell, a former CIA agent, in his book In Search of Enemies, said "Covert operations are incompatible with our system of government, and we do them badly." What's your answer to that?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't agree with that. I think in many cases, we may want to be in a position of helping our friends, but our friends, for very sound political reasons, are not able to take our help openly. They may have a powerful Communist Party within their country. They may have certain political constraints within their country. And yet it may be important to the survival of a democratic form of government to receive some assistance from us. And I believe the President of the United States ought to have some capability to do things. He ought to have some means that fall short of sending in the Marines and are somewhat stronger than simply diplomatic notes.

The real issue is maintaining the proper controls on this kind of action that's used very sparingly, that should be used only when it is necessary to carry out the foreign policy of the United States, and it should and does indeed have the approval of the President of the United States. And when it occurs, various committees of Congress are briefed so that they can take positions if they believe the action is unwarranted.

JOINER: I believe that those briefings are not always candid. We've had a former CIA Director, Richard Helms, who was censured and pleaded nolo contendere to the fact that he lied to those committees about U. S. involvement in Chile.

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I'm not in a position to speak for the former Director. But I can assure you that both Director Turner and I testified at our confirmation hearings that we intend to be totally forthcoming with the committees of Congress and....

JOINER: You're saying is the past is past....

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, as I say, I'm not really in a position to pass judgment on previous Directors.

JOINER: You're in the CIA. How can you not be in a position -- you're in a better position than anyone on the outside is.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, when this occurred, as I recall, I happened to have been Ambassador to Portugal and was not following domestic events that closely. And it's really a matter for the courts to make these kinds of judgments, and let the courts speak for themselves. All I can speak for is the present management of CIA and the present administration. And we have been very open and very candid with Congress. And I think if one were to check with the chairmen of our committees, he would find that they would endorse that statement.

JOINER: How much can you really change the CIA? There have been five CIA Directors in the past five or six years. How much inertia do you find? I mean you just came to the CIA in February. Do you find it frustrating? A lot of people have said that you meshed your office to create change. I know that Admiral Turner has forced the resignations of many people to try and cut back on covert operations, and so forth. But there is in any kind of bureaucracy that self-interest to just self-perpetuate.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, certainly the CIA is no different than any other government agency. I myself have had the opportunity to serve in four or five different agencies. And one of the ones I served in was Health, Education and Welfare, and that kind of a question was a constant question when I got on HEW: "How can you possibly manage such a large place, and how can you make change?" The answer is that you proceed to institute the management tools and techniques that have been proven in both the government and private sectors. You try to exercise as much leadership as you can to determine just how your employees....

JOINER: It's a little different ball game.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: It's a little different ball game in the sense that we are dealing with a secret agency, and we have faced a lot of criticism, some just, a very lot of

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it unjust, and that unfortunately affects morale. But it's important to point out that the Pike Committee itself, which investigated the CIA, and in many instances was highly critical, pointed out that in virtually every instance where the CIA had been accused of wrongdoing, the particular act originated as the result of a decision by political powers, be they Presidents, or Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs; that CIA was simply carrying out policy. To blame the CIA for that is a little bit like blaming the army for the invasion of the Dominican Republic and the Marines for landing in Lebanon.

Let me make this point, and, as I said, I've served in a lot of government agencies the past twenty-five or twenty-six years. And I have never served with a more dedicated or competent group of people, a group of people who want to do the right thing and respond to leadership. I think they now have that leadership. And I'm quite encouraged about the kinds of things we can do in the intelligence world.

JOINER: On Monday in the New York Times, Sy Hersh had a story about an CIA analyst named David Sullivan, who resigned under pressure after leaking the information on the SALT talks and sources of -- and methods of obtaining information on the Soviet Union to Senator Jackson. Admiral Turner was noticeably and understandably very upset about that. And yet Mr. Hersh, in his article, went on to talk about this kind of political decision that is made that you were referring to; and that is that President Carter puts a high priority on a new SALT agreement.

Is that the kind of thing that might lead us into some problems with the Soviets over SALT, that there is a political decision made on how the President wants that to turn out? David Sullivan claims that it was important for Senator Jackson and senators, who then have to vote on and ratify the treaty, to know what his analysis was, which was that the Soviet Union has indeed gained ground strategically over the U. S. since 1963 and that they are really not serious about detente, which runs counter to a political policy in Washington.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that may be an overly simplistic description of a particular document. There are several parts to your question. One is that we are not a policy-making organization. And in order to be effective as an intelligence agency, we have to call the shots as we see them. So we do not try to tailor our intelligence estimates to suit policy. Indeed, on many occasions we are the ones who have to deliver the bad news to the President.

I might point out that in this particular case, the document in question was made available to Senator Jackson by Admiral Turner himself. So there was no effort to withhold

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the information from Senator Jackson. It's just a question of whether any employee of the agency can take it upon himself to leak classified information. There was no effort whatsoever to suppress any information that Mr. Sullivan had. But there are certain regulations on how classified documents shall be handled. And obviously if people can't follow those regulations, we cannot have an effective intelligence organization.

JOINER: This does bring up the whole question of internal security in the CIA and the question of critics. A number of former agents in the past few years have been writing books about the agency and getting criticisms and also court rulings about that. John Stockwell, in his book, says "The CIA's oath of secrecy has been desecrated in recent years, not by authors like Agee, Marchetti and Snepp, but by CIA Directors who led the CIA into scandals, absurd operations. At best, the oath was used to protect those directors from exposure from their underlings, although the directors themselves freely leaked information that approved their operational or political judgment.

Other critics have said that the problem is that if you are an individual with concerns over the CIA operations, or whatever, that it's very difficult to get your voice heard. So that perhaps this is the reason so many people have decided they've got to publish this information.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, my answer to that, in a word, Lynne, is nonsense. The Director's door is open. My door is open. We have an inspection corps in CIA that hears grievances. We have processing to make complaints heard. If people are not happy with us, they can go to the Intelligence Oversight Board, which is independent. It consists of three prominent Americans, Tom Farmer, former Governor Scranton, and former Senator Gore. It reports directly to the President and is charged with the responsibility of looking into wrongdoing that may come from any person whatsoever within the agency or without. We have no say over it. People can go directly to them.

They can also go to the congressional oversight committees. The interesting thing about some of our erstwhile publishers who say they are, in fact, whistleblowers -- and indeed, we need whistleblowers in government -- is that they did not seek to avail themselves of the internal procedures to express their dissent before they went public.

JOINER: Some of the books that I've read claim that they tried over a number of years. These are officers who had been in the Company for ten, twelve, fourteen, sixteen years. What do you think prompted them to do that? Personally, why do you think they did it?

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I'm not in the very best position to attribute motives to them. But I'd simply point out that some of them have made substantial financial gain out of this.

In the case of Mr. Snepp, he was seen personally by the Director and assured the Director that the CIA would be allowed to review his book before it was published. And he did not do that. He, in effect, lied to the Director. Now, we cannot have an intelligence organization, as I mentioned before, if any employee can come in, work for a few years for the agency and decide to go out and write whatever he wants in a book. Nobody anywhere in the world is going to talk to us if they think that their names are going to appear in a book, and we're just not going to have information.

So unless we can control this problem, there is no way that I think we can have an effective intelligence organization.

JOINER: Some people, some critics say that there is a double standard, though, that in Snepp's book, he did not disclose any secrets or confidential information. As a matter of fact, one of his lawyers is going before the 4th District Court of Appeals today, saying that there was no classified information in the book, and that he should be absolved of any wrongdoing in that case; but that at the other end of the scale, former directors, such as Mr. Helms, who admitted to lying before the Senate committee, is given a suspended sentence and no fine, that there is, indeed, a double standard between those who are on a working level and those who are on a policy level.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, in the cases of former directors who have written books, I'm not aware of any book written by Mr. Helms. Mr. Colby wrote a book, and one of my predecessors, General Walters, wrote a book. They both submitted their books to the agency for review. Now, we made suggestions on things that were sensitive that could be taken out of the books, and they followed those suggestions.

I might mention, by the way, that we don't have the right to censor. If someone submits a book to us for review and we suggest that there's classified that ought to be taken out and they refuse, then we have to avail ourselves of judicial means to try and get the information reviewed. So there is no double standard. Former directors have submitted their books.

The question is whether employees....

JOINER: ...it's not so much the books. Sometimes it's just the idea of people speaking out about the CIA as opposed to Senate testimony, in a Senate committee. And even John Stockwell admits that he stonewalled, that he did not disclose a lot of

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information about the Angola matter.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Okay, well, you're back on Mr. Stockwell....

Q: No, I'm saying it's the contrast, critics have pointed out, between a former director who can get away, quote, unquote, with lying to a Senate committee as opposed to someone who has been an agent on a lower level, who then feels the need to talk about some of the abuses he's seen in the agency, but doesn't feel he can get any change....

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make it clear that the agency isn't seeking to immunize itself from charges of abuses. Our purpose in asking that books be reviewed is to remove national security information. And if people want to write about agency policy, they are perfectly free to do so. We would not attempt to prevent that.

The problem that arose in the case of Mr. Snepp was that he chose to, in our judgment, breach his contract by not submitting the book. The issue is not whether there was classified information or not. The issue is who should decide whether there is classified information or not. Should it be Mr. Snepp, or should it be the agency review board? And....

Q: He claims at the time he was inducted into the CIA, no one told him about the, quote, unquote, dirty work of covert actions.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know what he means by dirty work of covert actions. The intelligence business obviously has some difficult moral issues to face. I can cite you one, what happens when you try to penetrate a terrorist group.

The best way to stop terrorism is to have penetration of a terrorist group. What if your agent is ordered to go on a hit? If you don't do it, then maybe he is killed. Well, if you can't participate in an assassination, how about a bank robbery? Well, if you say no, you lose your agent. If you lose your agent, maybe you don't get a warning that some Ambassador's going to be assassinated.

These are difficult calls. It isn't always pleasant work. You cannot set up absolute moral standards. When in effect, in the espionage business, you are trying to encourage someone whose society is hostile to us to commit treason against his country, it isn't always pleasant. We try to exercise our best judgment. We try to be as consistent as we can with the moral values of our country. But we're also conscious that we have national security responsibilities. If Mr. Stockwell was

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unhappy with some of the things that he saw, there were plenty of internal channels available to him to make his dissent known.

JOINER: Some friends said he tried. But let's move on to something else. And that is the whole issue of whether or not covert actions are as necessary now that we have very technically competent, sophisticated systems of gathering information; for example, some secret spy satellites. Right now in Indiana there's a trial going on with a man named Kampiles, who got ahold of a secret page, or, rather, manual on these.

What effect does that trial have on national security?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, Lynne, it would be very inappropriate for me to comment on a case under litigation, because it might prejudice the case one way or another. But let me try to answer your basic question, which is, if I understand it correctly, the use....

JOINER: Are covert actions as necessary now that we have spy satellites that can see where agents can't see?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make a distinction, by the way, because the term covert actions is a term of art, which generally means some kind of special activity designed to influence a given situation. But those are very few and far between.

Clandestine collection where we try to obtain agents who will give us information on what is going on that is simply normally being denied to us is, I think, what you're referring to. Is that kind of collection necessary now that we have technical systems? A lot has been made of our technical systems, and certainly they are very impressive, particularly for monitoring such things as a SALT agreement. On the other hand, a technical system can only tell you what has happened. It can't tell you what people's intentions are. And in a world where you have strategic parity, it is very important to know what people's intentions are. And for the foreseeable future, we will still need that human intelligence in order to know what people intend to do rather than what they have done.

JOINER: You have been on both sides. You have been in foreign policy-making as a diplomat with the State Department, and now you're with the CIA. How do you see that division? Is there too much rivalry between different agencies of our government that are involved in foreign affairs? Is it effective cooperation? As a former diplomat, don't you get a little uncomfortable?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, no, I'm not at all uncomfortable in my job. I was asked this question at my confirmation

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hearing: did I ever have any problems with the CIA? And I said, no, indeed I did not. I always had a very good working relationship. This is not to say that every Ambassador would make the same response. But I think it is fair to say that relationships between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency are excellent. We confer on a daily basis with them. Frequently we work out our problems together. We, as a mechanism, try to be supportive, pursuant to the congressional and other constraints on us, of U. S. foreign policy. I think the coordination, by and large, is very effective. And certainly in the field, I receive almost every ambassador who comes to town and talk to him about his relationship with our people overseas. And I receive very few complaints.

There are always bureaucratic problems in the government. But I think we seem to be overcoming the more difficult problems.

JOINER: Recently there's been a lot of headlines in the news about what's going on in Iran. How far will the CIA go to protect the Shah?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, you're asking the wrong person, because you yourself a few minutes ago made the distinction between policy and intelligence. And the question you are asking....

JOINER: Isn't that distinction kind of blurred sometimes?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We try not to blur it. No, ma'am. Well, no, in fact it is not blurred. We do not vote, for example, at National Security Council meetings on policy decisions. We provide information.

JOINER: But you were talking about how important the discovery of intentions are. And that is part of the CIA's job. If indeed the CIA perceives those intentions in such a way that prove to be incorrect, doesn't that affect the policy?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, yes.

JOINER: Hasn't that happened in the past?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I'd be the last person to claim that we have a hundred percent batting average. It's very difficult to predict violent upheavals. We do the best we can with the resources at our command. We try to provide the President, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with the best intelligence that we can. We're not always right. I think we're often right than wrong.

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JOINER: What's the worse error you've made in judgment in the past ten years?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: In the past ten years? Well, I haven't been in the agency in the past ten years.

JOINER: All right, since you've been there.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: I was an Ambassador to a country where a revolution took place that was not predicted, Portugal, so I have direct experience of knowing what happens when you do not foresee these things. I can't claim that that's an error of judgment, because I don't know all the judgments that have been made over these past ten years. I could have used a little bit more information in Portugal at the time.

It's awfully easy when a coup occurs to say, well, why didn't you know about it? But obviously the person in power didn't know about it either. So it's not always the easiest thing to find out, but we do our best.

JOINER: Besides trying to deal with the intentions of foreign powers, or whatever, you also have to deal with contingency plans, "What if something happens?" Obviously in Portugal you wish that there had been a "what if" contingency plan. But recently CBS News in London has interviewed a man who claims to have been a deputy press agent to the Shah. He resigned. And he claims that the CIA has indeed prepared a contingency plan. I would assume that there probably is. I don't expect you to tell me what it is. But he does claim that the CIA has trained military officers from Iran in this country to take over in case the Shah is deposed or if it becomes necessary for him to give up the reins of power in his country.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I don't know of such plans.

JOINER: You know of no such contingency plans?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, obviously, when you've got an unstable situation, an Intelligence organization has to try to look into the future and predict what might happen. But what you were talking about once again comes in the area of covert action. And for such a proposal to take place, you would need a presidential finding and briefings of seven committees of Congress, and I'm not aware of any such finding.

JOINER: You can't give me any idea of how far the United States and the CIA is will to go to protect the Shah?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, that's a policy question. That really is a question that ought to be addressed to

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the Secretary of State or the President of the United States. I cannot really exceed my mandate.

JOINER: What advice do you give to companies, international American companies, that deal in a country as explosive as Iran, for example, under the present circumstances? What kind of advice is being given to them by the CIA, based on your intelligence gathering?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, once again, that's the responsibility of the State Department and the Ambassador: the protection of American citizens. All I can do there to help you is to divorce myself from my CIA role and recall my experience in Portugal in 1975, which I think it's fair to say was an even more chaotic situation. And it was my responsibility as the American Ambassador to try and advise Americans whether they should stay or leave. My best judgment at the time was that they should stay, that they should keep in full contact with the Embassy, and, as problems arose, we'd try to work them out with the local government. As matters turned out, that proved to have been a wise decision.

I have no idea what Ambassador Sullivan is advising Americans in Iran today, but that's really his principal responsibility.

JOINER: Can the U. S. deal with the Moslems if they take power in Iran? Have we contacts with the Moslems?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: We have succeeded in dealing with any number of governments around the world. It really.....

[End of Side 1.]

JOINER: Does the CIA continue to use -- have they ever and do they continue to use multinational American corporations?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we, for obvious reasons, have a practice of not confirming or denying what kind of covert arrangements we use. There are people, such as Mr. Agee, who engage full time in trying to reveal the names of CIA agents, and indeed incite people to violence against them. And he puts out a monthly publication in Washington called "Covert Action." I feel a very keen responsibility, in light of some unfortunate incidents in the past, to do everything I can to protect our employees and our agents.

So we just do not discuss those arrangements.

JOINER: Does the CIA -- this has been claimed by some critics -- that to get around the Freedom of Information Act,

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separate files are kept, not official files, but what are called soft files are kept. Senator Clark went to Africa on a fact-finding mission during the Angola conflict in '75. And according to some books I've read, they pulled out soft files so that in case an American citizen ever wants to know what is in their file, these do not count. Does that go on?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, I read the same book, which I believe Mr. Stockwell wrote. And I sort of asked the question, and nobody could find any soft files for me.

I think it is important to note that any intelligence organization follows a policy of compartmentation, so to speak. And that is, one part of the organization does not know what the other part is doing. And that is done for security reasons. The only place where it really starts to come together is at my level and the Director's level. So there are a number of different filings.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, we're given requests. We may have to search up through 23 different filing systems. In fact, we spend over 109 man years and \$2 1/2 million answering Freedom of Information requests. We get about 85 a week, and it costs us \$540 per request. And so we do have to go through a lot of filing systems. But I know of no, quote, "soft" or secret filing systems.

JOINER: Another thing that has come up is the role of academics and consultant roles with the CIA. What exactly does the consultant -- what do consultants do? How necessary are they? Some universities, such as Harvard, have drawn up guidelines, which Admiral Turner is very concerned about. Isn't it true that one way the CIA can get the necessary research that it feels it needs from academics is to set up special institutes to study these things? The Rand Institute, for example, has been for years working on projects for different departments of the government. Stanford Research Institute in our own area is close to an academic university, and its ties are separate.

Hasn't the agency side-stepped the concern by students and faculty over involvement with the CIA?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we don't think we've side-stepped it at all. In fact, we've been engaged in quite lengthy and, we hope, constructive dialogues with president Bach of Harvard on this issue, and the presidents of some other universities as well.

It is very important, if we are to have the best analytical work possible for our policy-makers, that we have some outside input. And there's a great deal of knowledge in the academic world. We'd like to be able to call on that academic

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knowledge. When we do undertake contracts with the universities for research projects, we make this known to the head of the university, ask him whether he wants to accept the contract. It's his decision whether he wants to make it public.

The question that seems to arise more frequently is, well, what about relationships with individual faculty members? The Harvard guidelines, if I understand them correctly, would oblige CIA to make those contracts be public. And frankly, we think that abridges the civil rights of the individual faculty member. We tell him he is perfectly free to advise the president of the university if he wants of his relationship with us. But that decision is really up to him. And we don't see any reason why CIA or the U. S. government, in effect, should be singled out for particular discriminatory treatment by a university. There are any number of companies that have contracts with different faculty members. Sometimes those contracts are made known; sometimes they aren't, depending on the individual faculty member. And we see no reason why we should be any different.

JOINER: William Paisley was found floating in the Chesapeake Bay a month ago, a little more than that. At first the agency said that he had no connection any more with the CIA. Then it was discovered that there were secret files, classified information on his boat.

Does that concern you that he disappeared that way?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, let me make a couple of corrections there. I don't think we issued any statement that he had no connections with the CIA. I think we indicated that he had retired from the CIA. He was serving in a consultative capacity. Point number one.

And point number two, there were no classified documents on the boat. There were some press articles to that effect, but those articles were inaccurate.

Point number three is that this was really a case for the Maryland State Police. They conducted the investigation. I think they called on us for help. We tried to respond. They....

JOINER: Did they call on you for help?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: They called upon us to look at some documents that were found on the boat. We looked at them and said these are not classified documents. I'm not aware of the details of what other assistance we may have provided. I don't think it was very significant. After an extensive investigation, they announced that while one can't be absolutely certain about these things, they assumed that it was an unfortunate suicide.

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And....

JOINER: One final question. If you were advising someone about the CIA, after what you've told me about the fact you can't have strong, absolute moral values with this kind of work, what would you say to those....?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Oh, I hope I didn't mislead you. I think certainly you can have strong moral standards. What I said is there are some difficult judgments that have to be made pursuant to those moral standards. But the strongest moral imperative, as far as I'm concerned, is that we live in the best society in the world. And I can say this after 23, 24 years' experience in the Foreign Service. It's a society worth protecting. We need a good intelligence organization to preserve the values we hold dear.

JOINER: Hasn't it been tarnished, though? I mean how do you attract the best people?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Well, we go back once again to the comment that a lot of the so-called abuses originated at the political level. And we don't have any trouble continuing to attract good people. Our applications continue at a high level. And I'm told that the people coming in are some of the best that we've had in the history of our agency.

JOINER: Thank you very much.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR CARLUCCI: Thank you.